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COMMENTS.

MR. EDITOR: While the article on "Future Retribution," in the March number of the REVIEW, is able and masterly, Archdeacon Farrar does not pretend to criticise the argument of Dr. Shedd's thesis, "The Certainty of Endless Punishment," in the issue of the preceding month. A word or two, therefore, in reply to Dr. Shedd may not seem inappropriate. At the outset he lays much stress upon the question, "What do law and justice do when they punish?" declaring that everything depends upon the correct solution of this. His answer is both unique and startling: "Punishment, therefore," he says, "is wholly retrospective in its primary aim. It looks back at what has been done in the past. Its first and great object is requital. A man is hung for murder, principally and before all other reasons because he has voluntarily transgressed the law forbidding murder. He is not hung from a prospective aim, such as his own moral improvement, or for the purpose of deterring others from committing murder." And again, "Neither is it true that the first and principal aim of punishment is the protection of society and the public good. This, like the personal benefit in the preceding case, is only secondary and incidental." Under ordinary circumstances, an utterance so jurisprudentially unsound, and so ethically untenable, might pass for mere chicane, but the evident sincerity of the writer, and his assumption of learning upon the subject, lend at least a temporary significance. "Preventive justice," says Blackstone, "is, upon every principle of reason, of humanity, and of sound policy, preferable in all respects to punishing justice." (Commentaries, B, iv. *251.) Kent does not consider it a *verata quæstio* when he speaks of "the proper object of punishment, the protection of society by the prevention of crime." (Commentaries, vol. ii. *13.) Mr. Austin more elaborately enunciates the same doctrine, saying, "It is certainly true that when the injury is treated as a crime, the end of the sanction [that is, the justification of human punishment] is the prevention of future wrongs. The sanction is pœna or punishment, strictly so called; that is to say, an evil inflicted on a given offender by way of example or warning, to use the word commonly used by Latin writers, and more especially by Tacitus — *documentum*. If the evil did not answer this purpose, it would be inflicted to no end." (Austin's Jurisprudence, § 722.) Nor can Sir James Stephen be quoted in support of any such theory as the one under consideration, for he argues for hatred and desire for deliberate revenge — motives that could hardly be applauded by a divine; and, instead of entirely subordinating preventive objects, advocates their concurrence, in these words: "The expression and gratification of these

feelings is, however, only one of the objects for which legal punishments are inflicted. Another object is the direct prevention of crime, either by fear or by disabling or even destroying the offender, and this, which is I think commonly put forward as the only proper object of legal punishments, is beyond all question distinct from the one just mentioned, and of coördinate importance with it." (History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. ii., pp. 82–3.) But quite apart from the *a posteriori* consideration of legal punishment, Dr. Shedd informs us that, regarded *a priori*, the theory of expediency fails at every point, and as a conspicuous instance of failure we are asked to imagine the case of but a single person in the universe, whose transgressions against the "law of God" could not be punished by the laws of man. *Cessanti ratione, cessat et ipsa lex* is a propædeutic maxim, which the learned doctor applies elsewhere in his article, where it is quite irrelevant. It were well to apply it here. Of course no human laws could govern the acts of such an individual, for the obvious reason that human law is conversant only about men in social conditions; and it would be impossible for one so circumstanced to commit crimes against society — *mala prohibita*. His offenses would be *mala in se*, for which he would only be answerable to a tribunal the laws of which differ as well in kind as in degree. Finally, such a case is "beyond common manners, common sense, and common comprehension." To analyze this article carefully would be both tedious and unprofitable. The examples of the argument offered are typical. Statements much to be doubted are made with unqualified assurance; while nearly every page shows some *non-sequitur* taken as the premise of a conclusion that is itself a paralogism.

C. DAVIS ENGLISH.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. Powderly's article on the "Army of the Discontented" is as sad as it is true, and "pity 'tis, 'tis true"; but it disappoints one by the single remedy it suggests for the double-millioned evil it depicts. He proves that there are probably two millions of American workmen enduring all the wrongs of involuntary idleness. This means that our American army of the discontented is already so large that, if each member of it in passing a given point — let us say Trinity Church — were to spend just one minute in stating his or her personal grievance, and if the ragged army should thus march in single file night and day, never once halting, three years and nearly ten months would pass into eternity before the melancholy stories would come to an end! And this in 1885! But the reduction of the hours of labor would not remedy this evil, although in itself it would be a beneficent reform — beneficent, because, with nations as with individuals, it is criminal to sacrifice the man to the money-maker. I take it that man was put on this planet for a loftier destiny than to grind in the mills of our manufacturing Philistines all day long, and far into the night; and that the nation whose laborers are mere "hands," however much it may have to show of wealth accumulated, is a nation rather to be pitied than envied. That country is the happiest in which wealth, intelligence, and leisure are most widely and most equitably diffused. Two millions of workers out of work! Surely it is a vital problem. For not only are these men non-producers and non-consumers, but the entire cost of their subsistence — every dollar that is spent for their food and clothing — is a direct and needless tax on the common wealth of the active producers.

Permit me to catalogue a few only of the remedies that some of us believe must be applied for an evil so great and growing and threatening. Before the army of the discontented can be disbanded, there must be: 1. Land limitation. This means that no man shall hold a single acre of arable land on which he does not live, and which he does not cultivate; that non-cultivation shall invalidate land titles, or give the state the right to force the non-tilling owner to sell it. 2. Prohibition of ground leases in cities. This means that owners must build on their city lots, or else pay taxes equivalent to the value of improved adjacent lots, or else sell their land to those who are willing to build up the city. 3. Prohibition of the ownership of more than two lots by any citizen within a city's limits. This means that a house and a store any man may own, if he can buy or build; but that we shall not all live for the chief end of supporting our landlords. 4. Abolition of all laws for the collection of debts, so that trade may be protected from panics and the widespread bankruptcies whose total final cost comes on the whole industrious community. When trust is dead, business will be founded on the solid rock of solvency, and not till then. 5. Total prohibition of foreign manufacturing competition in our markets. We should hold our American markets sacred for our American citizen only. "Protection" is a coward's compromise. 6. A national or state ownership of all the mineral wealth of the country not yet appropriated. We can spend our mineral riches quite as well as the bonanza kings. 7. National ownership of the telegraphs and railroads. 8. Cumulative income taxation. 9. Abolition of the monopolies in banking, in transportation, in patents, and in copyrights, whereby the state shall secure, for the benefit of all the people, the great profits of fire and life insurance, of the circulation of representative money, and of the railroad traffic; and refuse so to lend the power of the commonwealth that inventions which they protect shall be transformed into instruments for increasing their burdens. These are only a few of the remedies that the thinking men in the Army of Discontent are preparing to present for political discussion. We do not mean robbery of the rich, or the confiscation of their wealth, but we do mean to endure no longer the oppression legalized by classes, or the constant reduction of our remuneration. We don't mean revolution, but we do mean business.

JAMES BERWICK.

MR. EDITOR: Upon the two articles in the REVIEW for January, 1884,— one, by Governor Murray, against Mormonism; the other, by John Taylor, President of the so-called Mormon Church, in favor of it,— permit an old resident of Utah to comment briefly. It will occur to every thoughtful person, at all familiar with the situation, who reads these articles, that plenty of attack as weak as Murray's, and plenty of defense as able as Taylor's, will go far toward making Mormonism the dog that will wag the tail for the entire inter-mountain region in the near future. Taylor shows quite conclusively the unconstitutionality of the Edmunds law, and points out an infamous instance of maladministration of it by the Commission, which was accomplished by interpolating into the oath required of voters before registering, the words, "in the marriage relation." This they did to enable open evil-livers — non-Mormon — to register and vote. Murray labors through an hypothetical indictment of the Mormons, of great length, and winds up by

proposing "a commission to govern Utah"; and, scenting war in the distance, concludes by saying, "If that should prove insufficient, the exigencies of the future will demand more effectual measures." Just why the most prosperous and best governed of the Territories should be governed by a commission, is something that the incoming Administration and coördinate branches of our great Government will honestly investigate before moving in that direction. When I say best governed, I mean that Territory where we find the greatest safety for life and property, with minimum taxation, together with harmony and contentment among the populace. You naturally ask, If this be true, why all this noise about Utah and the Mormons? Notwithstanding Murray's drag-net indictment, it will be found upon trial that polygamy is the only "nigger in the Utah fence." To save time and expense, I would suggest that that other "nigger in the Yankee wood-pile," easy divorce, be caught on the same hunt and whitewashed at the same time. Since the unchastity that made divorces easy made Mormon polygamy possible and New England polygamy fashionable, I think it would be well for the Government to apply a universal remedy for both manifestations of a common evil from a common source. To this end, I would add to the clause on the subject of religion in the Constitution, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," the words, "but Congress shall prevent the practice of crime in the name of religion." Upon such an amendment, a universal law that would uproot polygamy could be constitutionally enacted and enforced. To rout New England's legal polygamy, I would interpolate the three words, "marriage and divorce," into the fourth division of Section 8 of Article I. of the Constitution, so that it would read, "Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, marriage, and divorce throughout the United States"; and then, by a national law, I would make divorces difficult. BALLARD S. DUNN.

MR. EDITOR: Judge Pitman, in his recent article on "Woman as a Political Factor," holds, as monarchists of all ages have, that the suffrage is not a "natural right" of any being. This depends entirely upon the interpretation of the word "natural." On the supposition that a man is born to certain responsibilities, we judge also that he is born to certain rights. Every man is born with the burden laid upon him, according to all orthodoxy, to prolong his life as long as possible; to uphold the government under which he lives; to maintain justice and order, so far as he can; and to live up to the highest standards of which he is cognizant. The natural rights that our great fathers of independence defined were those which every man possesses — the rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." But liberty of the highest kind — in fact, of the only genuine kind — can be secured only under a good government. Every man, then, has the right to maintain, so far as the efforts of one man can avail, a good government to protect his liberty. He was born with the burden upon him to bear arms, when he should grow up, in defense of his government, if called upon; to shed his life's blood, if need be, to maintain it; to pay taxes upon his property to support it; to yield up all personal privileges, in an emergency, for the great universal

privilege of a good national government. Why, then, was he not born with the right to a voice in the selection of the rulers who constitute this government? If birth under any rule entails such heavy responsibilities, why is it not true that privileges of equal moment are a part of a man's birthright? It seems not only reasonable, but necessary, that the responsibility of the defense and upholding of government should be correlated with the privilege of partially making the government which one's life may go to defend and uphold.

KATE UPSON CLARK.

MR. EDITOR: Justice Hargis, in the interesting discussion of the law's delay, contributed to the April number of the REVIEW, is undoubtedly right in attributing that delay very largely to hasty and defective legislation. But the question still remains, Who is really to blame for such legislation? Lawyers and judges have long been accustomed to say, when statutes prove to be bad or erroneous, "We must take the law as we find it. We do not make it; we only execute it. The courts are one thing; legislatures are another." Let us see about that. Congress is crammed with lawyers, and every legislature in the country contains a large proportion of lawyers, if indeed they are not actually in a majority. And in every one of these legislative bodies the lawyers take a leading part. It is their business (if anybody's) to know what laws are practicable, and how they should be framed. A farmer, mechanic, merchant, clergyman, or teacher in a legislature may have a good idea, or understand and represent the wishes of the people, and may present them with force and clearness in debate; but when those wishes are to be embodied and uttered in the form of a statute, it is preëminently the business of the lawyers holding seats in that legislature to see to it that the statute is properly constructed, both as to its immediate purpose and as to its bearing on statutes already in existence, so that the courts shall have no difficulty in handling it. If not, what under heaven are so many of them there for? On all other accounts, they are the least desirable class of legislators. Suppose a legislature that contained a large number of artists and art-critics should make an appropriation for a picture or statue that proved to be a failure, should we not all hold them responsible for it? Suppose a legislature that included many school-masters and proof-readers passed bills that were full of bad spelling and could not be parsed, who would refrain from deriding the school-masters and proof-readers? The responsibility for defective and impracticable laws lies unquestionably with the guild of lawyers; and they may count themselves fortunate if they escape the suspicion of sometimes shaping legislation so as to increase litigation. But there is another thing in Judge Hargis's article that strikes an Eastern reader with surprise. He alludes, as if it were a well-known fact, to the effect produced on judges and juries by fear of mob violence. Pray, where is this an element of serious consideration in the courts? Is it so in his State of Kentucky? Surely we have nothing of the sort in New York.

ALEXANDER C. VERNON.

MR. EDITOR: I am going to speak an honest word concerning the literary hash of the period, even though I should be impaled on my own pen. Is there nothing new under the sun? Have we no writers, no poets, no

literary men who can create anything, but must we have the old authors, the old poets, the recent-dead writers, continually hashed up for our reading? I open my literary newspaper, and there I find Margaret Fuller, Hawthorne, Harriet Martineau, George Eliot, Carlyle and his wife, and dozens of lesser writers, dished up in various forms and shapes. In the popular magazines I find old comedies that ought to have died long ago, old poems that nobody cares to read in their original bindings, old madrigals sadly out of tune in this age, written by authors dead a hundred years ago. I open my NORTH AMERICAN, and there I find — what? Emerson again! Yes, in a notice of Mr. Holmes's dear old gossipy book. For the past year the reading public has had Mr. Emerson served before it in every possible shape. First, it was ten days at the Concord School of Philosophy, where everybody, great and small, had his say; and then it was the newspapers and magazines, where all sorts of writers and speakers gave their estimate of this great man and his writings. I complain no more of your own critic than of others who have reviewed Mr. Emerson's character. He has given a fair *critique* from his own stand-point, and I thank him for omitting the most "gossipy" parts. Mr. Holmes's book may be delightful reading to some persons, but many of its details are too trivial to suit the taste of such a devout admirer of Mr. Emerson's genius as your correspondent. For instance, I do not care to know that Mr. Emerson had thirty-two great-grandfathers, or that a sharp bargain was driven with the stone-cutter who recorded their excellencies on their tombstones. And it pains me to read that "Master Ralph Waldo used to sit on a brick wall, longing for pears which belonged to his neighbor"; and that he was once "carried in his night-gown to a neighboring house." But if these little details of a hero's life are painful to read, what shall be said of the story of Emerson as a perpetual devourer of that New England conglomerate, pie? Yet Mr. Holmes tells us that Mr. Emerson was a "hopelessly confirmed pie-eater"; that he ate it for breakfast, when "morning opes with haste her lids," on his journeys, and perhaps even for luncheon, when he was writing those great thoughts of which your critic so justly speaks. Shall a god eat pie? I do not like to have my illusions dispelled in this way. I like to think of Emerson and the other great writers as I know them through their books, and prefer to form my own estimate of their characters. I deplore this literary hash, and I desire in future to take my gods "clear," neither seasoned by weak praise nor warmed over to suit the popular taste.

HARRIET H. ROBINSON.

MR. EDITOR: In the April number of the REVIEW appeared an article from Robert Buchanan, on "Free Thought in America." After an attempt at belittling Colonel Ingersoll, — a man he does not understand, and whose work he cannot appreciate, — Mr. Buchanan discourses of Mr. O. B. Frothingham's belief, wherein that reverend gentleman is represented as "lost in amazement that humanity ever contained that other idea of a personal immortality." All he can venture to say in plea for it is that "its very audacity favors it, its very wildness is its guarantee." Mr. Buchanan asks "how a faith can be vindicated by its own sheer improbability, how a belief may be true because it goes in the teeth of all experience," and leaves the question to be

decided by the transcendentalists of free thought. To show Mr. Buchanan that the "bad logic" he refers to has the sanction of precedence, I refer him to Tertullian's reasoning upon the Christian evidences, as follows: "I find no other means to prove myself to be impudent with success, and happily a fool, than by my contempt of shame; as, for instance, I maintain that the Son of God was born. Why am I not ashamed of maintaining such a thing? Why, because it is a shameful thing. I maintain that the Son of God died; well, that is wholly incredible, because it is monstrously absurd. I maintain that after having been buried, he arose again; and that I take to be absolutely true, because it was manifestly impossible." (Tertullian's "De Carne Christi.") Justin Martyr's "Apology to the Emperor Adrian" contains an example of such reasoning; in fact, such "bad logic" seems to have been the peculiar refuge of theologians in all ages, and transcendentalism cannot be justly charged with its introduction.

E. Q. NORTON.

MR. EDITOR: Orthodoxy gives man an immortal soul, sends the finally impenitent to eternal suffering in hell. Dr. Shedd *et al.* logically, but gently, infer eternal increase in sin and suffering. Over fifty years ago, Professor Finney, in a revival sermon, with the utmost energy asserted, "I believe the period will come in the history of every impenitent sinner when God will be compelled to exert the utmost of his infinite power to hold the wretch in existence while he inflicts upon him the utmost of his infinite vengeance." One poor woman was made insane by such blasphemy. Dr. Shedd's hell is not large nor comparatively populous. Christ declares the road to hell broad, crowded; that to life, narrow, found by few. If the "broad way" leads to an "orthodox hell," man's creation was a cruel mistake. The Bible and modern science utterly deny these orthodox premises. Science shows that a complex brain thinks, wills, feels; can be deranged, making insanity; can be small, with feeble mental manifestations; and large and vigorous, with corresponding talents. God must create each; then why depraved? This whole matter of souls is a fiction. God made no error when his sentence fell on Adam's body solely — "Dust thou art, and unto dust." Pressure, concussion of the brain, suspends consciousness; death terminates it; resurrection restores it. The judgment decides who are fit for immortality, who are only fit for "the second death." The latter are "chaff," "tares," "to be burned up," "burned to ashes," utterly destroyed, root and branch. Nuisances are forever abated.

D. H. CHASE.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. Warner's admirable paper on the Elmira Reformatory proves that there are two distinct classes in the tribe of professional criminals—the class that can be reformed, and will reform under a sufficiently strong inducement (just as they fell), and the irreclaimable class, who, either by inherent indolence or hereditary instincts, deliberately prefer to lead a criminal life. But our laws take no cognizance of these two classes. They regard acts only. To certain crimes certain penalties are affixed; the penalty paid, the criminal at once resumes all his rights as a citizen. Supposing that ten families lived on a self-governed island, would they permit any one family

among them to adopt crime as a permanent profession; that is to say, to refuse to contribute by labor to the wealth of the community, by good conduct to its moral welfare, by taxation to its comfort, and by personal aid, whenever called on, to its safety in times of danger? Yet this is what we do in our America. We know that there is a permanent criminal class, who live by lawlessness; and yet after any one of its members has served out his sentence for a crime, we turn him loose on the community without asking or expecting that he will furnish any guarantee for his future good behavior, knowing, indeed, that when we release him we are licensing him to prey on the law-abiding citizens. The great criminals — such as burglars, highwaymen, and murderers — should be classified as social rebels, as the permanent enemies of society, not to be placated, nor liberated, nor regarded as having any rights whatever (excepting the right of unconditional surrender) until they reform and give evidence of repentance, until they give such pledges of their honesty as shall make their freedom compatible with a proper regard for the safety of the community. Industry should no longer be taxed to support a criminal class. We need a penal colony for the irreclaimable, a country where their escape would be difficult or impossible, and where their labor could be utilized without competing with free labor in constructing great highways and other works of permanent public utility. Alaska has all the conditions that such a colony demands; for their exile there would be a benefaction as well as a punishment, because opportunities could be afforded there for out-of-door reformation which no Eastern community would safely tolerate. Let us have a penal colony in Alaska. J. V. NELSON.

MR. EDITOR: I would like to point out one or two instances of Dr. Shedd's illogical reasoning. He says that a just God and man's free will prove the endless punishment of the sinner. Man, being free, sins voluntarily; guilt once incurred is guilt forever; God, being just, punishes forever to satisfy justice, unless the sinner repent before dying. This is his argument in brief. But if God is just, will he be so unjust as to punish a soul in eternity for a sin committed in time? And if man has free will, is he not as free to return to God in repentance as to depart from him in sin? And if guilt is eternal, would a just God limit the hour of repentance to the temporal? It is true that it is written, "Now is the accepted time." But there is no proof, but every evidence to the contrary in philosophy and in reason, that this "now" does not mean to limit the time of repentance, but to invite the sinner to come at once. The "now" lasts forever; it is always the time to turn and be good, and never too late to come to the God of justice. Every deed must return upon the doer; every sin will receive its punishment, here or hereafter. But to limit the time for the return from sin to any hour, whether it be the hour of death or before or after death, would be the work of an unjust God. Further than this, such a limit to the time of return would destroy man's freedom, for the freedom of the will would be a farce if it lasted but three-score years and ten. A man who is allowed to sin voluntarily forever, and is not allowed after a certain time to repent and return to his God, cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be called a creature of free will. Man, to be free, must

be free forever, to sin or to be righteous at his own choice; and the God of justice, who is also the God of love and patience, will wait to receive his returning feet. Dr. Shedd's "orthodox" God is so far beneath our ordinary philanthropists, to say nothing of our ideals of philanthropy, that one can hardly help accusing of blasphemy those who so picture the All-loving One. A God that punishes men, not that they may be made better and led to return to him from choice, but only out of revenge for their evil-doing, is not a God of justice, but a fiend. There is no such God in reality; only in the illogical mind or the diseased imagination could such a one exist. The truth concerning Dr. Shedd's article is, that a man whose idea of hell is that of a place of endless punishment, who can say that "one sin makes guilt, and guilt makes hell," unless the sinner repents during the short period of earthly life, and who believes the Supreme Being to be a God of revenge, is himself in a mental state of "hell," to which the conventional hell is as water unto wine. He damns nobody but himself, however, and even his damnation cannot last forever; for God is waiting, and will wait, until all his children return to that union with and willing obedience to him "whose service is perfect freedom."

H. R. SHATTUCK.

MR. EDITOR: Judge Hargis has done a good service to the republic by his essay on "The Law's Delay"; but, as is natural enough, he sees more clearly the errors of other classes than the short-comings of his own class. He finds that the ignorant voter is a primal source of the law's delay, by his election to the legislature of demagogues ignorant of the principles of jurisprudence, or indifferent to the welfare of the State; and his first suggestion is that, from an early date in the future, no one shall be entitled or permitted to vote unless he shall be able to read and write. This condition precedent should have been demanded and enacted long ago; but it is too late now to remedy the error made in permitting ignorant citizens to wield the supremest function of citizenship. Law cannot cure this evil, because politicians make the laws, and they would not dare to apply such a legal remedy. But the evil is not, therefore, without a remedy. Multiply schools. Encourage every local effort to establish reading-rooms, and circulating libraries, and debating clubs, and lyceums. We cannot drive our illiterate voters to school, but we can influence them to become intelligent, or, as Tory Bob Lowe, now Lord Sherbrooke, put it, "we can educate our masters"; for else what right have we to regard ourselves as superior to them? Judge Hargis's own "section" would fiercely resist the project of legally limitating the suffrage to the male readers and writers, for, as the census shows, the Mississippi and South-western States would soon largely lose in their Congressional representation by such an enactment rigidly enforced. But, without doubting or discussing the other issues raised by the Judge,—as to the lobby, for example, and ignorant jurors,—let me ask of the lawyers, as a class, are they not the chiefest causes of the law's delays, and therefore are they not more responsible than any other class for the disrespect for the law that is now so serious and so saddening a feature of our national life? I think they are. Congress, for instance, and most of the State Legislatures, are largely composed of the legal profession, and always controlled by it. What example do lawyers as legislators set to

the people? Do they consecrate their whole time to their great client, the Nation, as Charles Sumner did in the Senate and Lincoln in the White House, or as the early Congressmen all did, and as all the Presidents have done? Instead of doing so, the legislative lawyers rarely hesitate to be absent to "argue cases," even when Congress is in session, and not one of them deems it his duty to spend his vacations in advancing the national interests. If our laws are not codified as they ought to be, is it not the Judge's "learned brothers," and not the people, who are to blame? It is not quite fair to speak vaguely of a class of "demagogues," in view of the indisputable fact that all our legislatures are dominated by lawyers. But there are two other causes of the law's delay, which, to my lay mind, seem quite as serious as any one of the causes indicated by the Judge. What is the *raison d'être* of a legal pleader? Surely, to give all men an equal chance under the law. But this principle has been steadily perverted, until now the practice reverses the original reason for tolerating advocates. Say, "I am ungifted of speech, and my antagonist is eloquent"; so, the law protects me against him by permitting me to hire an orator. But as I am only one man; what rightful excuse is there for permitting more than one man to represent me? Yet I have seen half a dozen lawyers engaged to defend one man, and half a dozen more to prosecute him, and this when both men, defendant and prosecutor, were famous orators. What is the practical result of this custom? Delay and injustice. It abolishes equality. It gives wealth an undue advantage. Appeals from court to court still further increase the chances of wealth to protect iniquity by the very machinery established to execute righteousness. Whatever tends to injustice destroys respect for law; and whatever weakens the people's faith in the justice of the law strengthens the belief that a social revolution is needed to remedy acknowledged wrongs. It is the grasping selfishness of capital that gives birth to the dreaded spirit of communism; and it is the lawyer that perverts the spirit of the laws who is the real leader of the mobs that obey Judge Lynch.

JOHN BALL, JR.